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ABSTRACT
This thesis set out to determine whether the Supreme Court’s abolishment of
Washington D.C.’s Firearms Control Regulations Act handgun ban in 2008 had any
impact on the city’s violent gun crime rates. Using an interrupted time series design,
analysis of FBI Uniform Crime Report monthly data revealed no statistically significant
association between the removal of the FCRA’s handgun band and decreasing gun
violence in Washington D.C. from 1998 to 2015.
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CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION

Gun Crime
Gun crime is prevalent in the United States. According to the U.S.
Department of Justice’s Bureau of Justice Statistics, between 1980 and 2008,
59.7% of individuals between the ages of 18-34 and 22% of individuals between
the age of 35-49 have been victims of gun homicide across the United States
(Cooper and Smith, 2012). The US government and the public are generally wellaware of our long history of gun violence, with an increasing public awareness of
how this is not only a problem for law enforcement officials but a public health
issue too, with about half of the country perceiving gun violence to be a
significant problem (Parker, Horowitz, Igielnik, Oliphant, and Brown, 2017). The
public, however, is divided over the most effective way of combating problems
associated with gun violence given the regnant culture of gun ownership and gun
rights assured by the Second Amendment, which for many Americans is the
defining feature of the nation’s history and national character, inextricable from
the very meaning of freedom itself. According to a survey conducted in
September of 2019 by the Pew Research Center, 60% of Americans say gun
laws in the U.S. should be more stringent, whereas 28% believe the laws are
strict enough, and 11% believe the laws should be less strict (Schaeffer, 2019).
Although many citizens can agree on a common goal, which is to reduce gun
crime and the significant harm that is its result, there are starkly contrasting
1

opinions about what is necessary and the most effective way to achieve this end.
The gun debate is, therefore, an intricate balance between gun ownership as a
right and primary manifestation of freedom and the ability of society to
legislatively combat persistent and harmful violence associated with guns.
Two of the most popular ideologies behind reducing gun crime are gun
control and gun decontrol. Proponents of gun control argue that reasonable
government regulation of firearms is the best way to reduce gun violence. On the
other side are gun decontrol proponents, who argue that if individuals have a
considerable amount of liberty regarding firearms such that every citizen has the
right to own and carry a firearm with minimal regulation, then they can protect
themselves, their property, and communities from harm. Underlying gun
decontrol proponents' thinking is the idea that others intending to harm will be
deterred by the expectation that otherwise, potential targets of gun violence are
likely to have the capability of defending themselves and, therefore, possibly
bringing harm to the potential offender.
The empirical literature pursuing different lines of gun control and gun
violence is plentiful and growing, yet often easy to either misinterpret or be
misused for political ends. Moreover, despite this literature, there does not seem
to be a clear empirically-supported answer as to which approach or combination
of approaches works best, even though the US has experienced a precipitous
decline in gun and other violence since the early 1990s. As discussed below, for
example, there are a variety of gun control measures that have been heralded by
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various political leaders and other public officials over the years, but few, if any,
have been demonstrated as having any demonstrable effect in reducing gun
violence. Conversely, the literature on guns used as a deterrent is also mixed,
and controversial, often eluding agreement among researchers.
Washington D.C. v. Heller 2008
The first case in nearly seventy years to consider firearm rights at the
individual level is Washington D.C. v. Heller (2008), which was a challenge to the
constitutionality of Washington D. C’s handgun ban and to the requirement that
firearms permitted under the act be trigger locked and remain unloaded and
disassembled when not in use (Carter, 2006). The Heller decision is useful in
assessing gun prohibition such that this case reversed Washington D.C.’s 1976
Firearms Control Regulations Act (FCRA), which until 2008, was generally
considered one of the most restrictive gun policies in the nation (Collin et al.,
1991).
The Heller case was brought by Dick Anthony Heller, a D.C. metropolitan
special police officer. Heller filed a complaint to the district court because, under
D.C.’s Firearms Control Regulations Act of 1976 (FCRA), his request for a
license to own a firearm was denied. Heller was shocked to learn that even
though he was a police officer who was authorized to carry a gun for work, he
could not own a private handgun under the FCRA. Heller believed that his
Second Amendment right to keep and bear arms was being violated. The district
court, however, did not entertain his complaint, and therefore, Heller turned to the
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U.S. Court of Appeals, which subsequently agreed with his contention. The case
was eventually heard by the Supreme Court, which on June 26, 2008, ruled in
favor of Heller, striking down the FCRA’s registering requirement, as well as
overturning the restrictive storage requirements for all firearms, noting that these
parts of the FCRA violated the Second Amendment.
Justice Scalia wrote the majority opinion for the court; finding that an
individual does not have to be in service to a militia in order to possess the right
to own a firearm and use it within the scope of the law, for example, in selfdefense while in one’s residence (District of Columbia v. Heller, 2008). In the
ruling, the court addressed what have come to be known as the prefatory clause,
which involves service in a militia, and operative clauses, which is the right to
keep and bear firearms, in deciding on whether the Second Amendment applies
to individuals or whether it is a collective right tied to service in a militia. The only
other time the Supreme Court addressed this point of contention was in United
States v. Miller (1939). However, in the Miller case, the Court did not take up the
relationship between the prefatory and operative clauses (Klukowski, 2009).
Nevertheless, the court found that the framers of the Constitution did not only
grant the right to bear arms specifically to an army or "militia," but that the term
can be interpreted to encompass all men who are able-bodied to serve in a
militia. The operative clause, according to the majority, therefore, is not to be
limited by the prefatory clause regarding an individual’s right to keep and bear
arms, including handguns.
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Purpose of this Study
From 1976 to 2008, the FCRA remained in full effect; therefore, this period
in D.C.'s history is useful in analyzing changes to a long-established gun policy.
As such, this study will focus on changes to violent gun crime trends as a result
of the Washington D.C. v. Heller 2008 Supreme Court decision overturning
D.C.’s ban on handguns and other restrictive provisions of their 1976 Firearms
Control Regulations Act. In other words, the research question driving this study
asks whether the Heller decision, which reversed Washington D.C.’s 1976 FCRA
had any significant effect on gun-related violent crime trends in Washington, D.C.
Additionally, using Detroit, Michigan, as a comparison city, this study aims to
determine if a change in policy regarding a handgun ban had any similar or
dissimilar effects on a city with comparable rates of violent gun crime and similar
population size?
The introduction of this study provided a brief overview of the Washington
D.C. v. Heller (2008) case at the center of this study, as well as the laws that
precede it. What follows this chapter is a review of relevant empirical literature
that includes a review of the history of gun ownership, violent gun crime and gun
control and decontrol policies, and public perceptions about gun control and gun
violence that frames our understanding of gun crime and policy in the United
States. Utilizing twenty years of data on violent gun crimes from Washington
D.C., that covers the decade before the 2008 Heller decision and five years after,
it will be possible to make an accurate statistical determination about whether a
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de facto gun decontrol policy had significant effects on serious gun violence in
Washington D.C. and Detroit, Michigan.
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CHAPTER TWO
REVIEW OF LITERATURE

Gun Culture in the United States
Before assessing the Handgun Ban set forth by Washington D.C. and
delving further into details of the Heller case and how it situates within the gun
control/gun crime debate, this study seeks to test a change of policy as a result
of the Heller ruling. Therefore, it is necessary to investigate the culture in which
the right to bear arms in the United States relates to crime that is associated with
licit and illicit gun availability, legislation, and other policies that have been
enacted to address the latter. Furthermore, an examination of the history of gun
legislation and firearms utilitarianism in the United States is vital information to
making sense of the present. Technological advances and inevitable change in
cultural dynamics have a profound effect on how US citizens interact with
firearms and perceive them in the 20th and 21st centuries. Thus, this next section
provides a brief history of firearms and the issues which have arisen because of
them in the US.
The Second Amendment and History of Gun Ownership
The United States was founded on several principles that are still valued
today. These principles were documented by the framers of the United States
Constitution, which delineates the operation of government and the rights of the
country's citizenry, one of them, the fundamental right, outlined explicitly in the
Second Amendment, for citizens to have the ability to bear arms. This right to
7

own and carry weapons has been an integral part of being a citizen and, thus,
US culture, and the people have maintained this right since this country’s
inception. Despite this history, there has been considerable debate about the
interpretation of the Second Amendment, regarding whether it is directed toward
individual citizens or states as a whole.
For roughly one-hundred years since the founding of the United States,
the ownership of a firearm was considered a fundamental aspect of being a
United States citizen. In a paper by Bellesiles (1996), the author explores the
historical origins of gun culture in the United States, analyzing the years 1760 to
1865. He found that gun culture is deeply rooted in American society due to
frontiersmen needing guns to establish modern America (Bellesiles, 1996).
Further, he points out that due to the necessity of firearms for self-defense and
the gathering of food, guns became an integral part of what it means to be an
American directly due to the fact that almost all of the early American settlers
owned one to fulfill such needs; thus spawning a gun culture (Bellesiles, 1996).
Taking from probate records, Bellesiles (1996) also found that around the
beginning of the nineteenth century, gun ownership was highest in the southern
region of the United States, especially in urban centers, and primarily owned by
whites. The period from 1820 to 1850 signified the beginning of the
industrialization of the arms industry. Moving forward, during the post-Civil War
reconstruction era of the 1870s, the first melting pot laws were passed, which
were effectively geared towards African-Americans (Funk, 1995). Melting pot
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laws are laws that remove the cheapest available firearms from the market; many
scholars theorize that such laws are, in effect, discriminatory to the poor (Funk,
1995). Even before the establishment of the United States, during the new world
era, there were laws passed that prevented African-Americans and low
socioeconomic status individuals from owning guns.
Moreover, in 1644, Virginia passed laws specifically barring AfricanAmerican people from owning firearms (Funk, 1995). In fact, according to
Bellesiles (1996), in antebellum America, many states had similar laws in place
barring African-Americans from possessing firearms. After the American civil war,
many southern legislatures were opposed to African-Americans owning guns due
to fear, and so these legislatures enacted laws known as the Black Codes.
Primarily, the Black Codes were laws that continued to bar the freed black slaves
from fundamental rights that had always been available to whites, rights such as
that to bear firearms (Funk, 1995). In United States v. Cruikshank (1875),
discriminatory laws such as the Black Codes were disputed. However,
unfortunately, the Supreme Court sided with the oppressors and continued to
deny rights to African-Americans, rights that were available to whites (Funk,
1995). African Americans were not the only population discriminated against via
government legislation; in 1911, the Sullivan law was drafted and enacted to bare
Italian immigrants from owning firearms (Funk, 1995).
Upon the beginning of the 20th century, subsequent to the first world war,
firearms came to be viewed as a potential cause of violence, and a means to
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maintain general disobedience towards the law (Miller, 2009). The United States
government first recognized firearms as a means to disobey the law during the
era of prohibition. The main reason was that organized crime syndicates began
to utilize firearms in order to facilitate the black market for alcohol and to fight off
any resistance met by the federal government (Miller, 2009). Due to the abuse of
firearms by organized crime groups, the federal government intervened by
enacting restrictive legislation regarding firearms in order to combat the general
disobedience concerning the law exhibited by the public. Laws such as the
National Firearms Act of 1934 and the Federal Firearms Act of 1938 were
implemented in the hopes of gaining back some control over the public (Miller,
2009). The National Firearms Act of 1934 was an attempt at regulating the
ownership of automatic machine guns and went as far as to impose a 200-dollar
tax on all gun sales.
Furthermore, the National Firearms Act of 1934 mandated that all
individuals who purchase a gun of any kind, have it registered with the authorities
(Miller, 2009). The Federal Firearms Act of 1938 mandated that all firearm sellers
obtain a federal license to sell firearms in the United States legally (Miller, 2009).
Three decades later, and after the assassination of Robert F. Kennedy, the US
responded with the Gun Control Act of 1968. This piece of legislation is
significant because it required tighter record-keeping on firearms, prohibited the
sale of firearms to persons with mental illness, as well as individuals charged
with a felony and who use illegal drugs, and it outlawed the sale of firearms
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between states and the sale of rifles by mail (Miller, 2009). Another significant
piece of gun regulation legislation is the Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act
of 1994. The Brady Act mandated a five-day waiting period and required a
background check before a licensed firearms seller could sell a gun (Miller,
2009). However, it is essential to note that as of 1998, the mandates for
handguns are no longer in effect; all other firearms are still covered under the
Brady Violence Prevention Act.
Relevant Supreme Court Cases
The first time that the Supreme Court dealt with a case concerning
firearms was in United States v. Cruikshank (1875). This case carried much
racial tension, as it had to do with the Ku Klux Klan attempting to bar African
Americans from owning firearms. Unfortunately, the Supreme Court ruled in favor
of the Klan, based on an interpretation of the Constitution's clause about the right
to bear arms. The court claimed that nowhere in the constitution did it say that
individual citizens have the right to own a gun, and therefore, it is not
unconstitutional to bar some citizens from owning one.
In 1984, the Supreme Court dealt with another firearm-related issue. The
case was Miller v. Texas (1984), in which the court ruled that the federal
government did not have the authority to restrict individual gun rights; however,
the states had the power to do so. In 1939, the Supreme Court heard the case of
Miller v. the United States, a case that dealt with the interpretation of the second
amendment according to the language of the Constitution. The Court determined
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whether the federal government has the authority to rule on firearms, which are
not needed to facilitate a well-regulated militia. Essentially this ruling dictated that
sawed-off shotguns are not necessary for a well-regulated militia according to the
federal government.

Gun Crime Trends
Gun violence has become a pressing issue in the United States of
America. Data from The National Center for Health Statistics and the Centers for
Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) show firearms becoming more involved in
homicides in recent years (Pifer and Minino, 2018). According to a CNN news
report, firearms have been shown to facilitate over two-thirds of homicides since
2014 (Scutti, 2018). Wintemute (2014) concurred with Scutti’s assertion, finding
that in 2012 alone, firearms were utilized in 69.9 percent of every homicide for
that year.
Considering the number of legislative actions related to firearms taken up
by the United States government and state and local governments throughout
the 20th century, there have been two pivotal periods regarding crime trends.
The first, from 1965 to 1980, during which researchers saw a sharp increase in
homicide rates and suicide rates, and the second period of interest is from 1993
to the present, during which researchers have noticed a sharp decline in overall
crime trends (Cook and Ludwig, 2000). Incidentally, there has not been a
definitive accepted explanation for the sudden decrease in crime rates since
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1993, despite many different explanations offered (Rosenfeld, 1997). The Bureau
of Justice Statistics (BJS) has also documented a steady decline in firearmrelated homicides from 1993 to 2011, resulting in a 39 percent decrease.
Furthermore, BJS researchers also found that non-fatal firearm crimes
decreased by 69 percent over the same period. The year 1993 is significant in
this context because gun-related homicides were at an all-time high for which we
have data (Cook and Ludwig, 2000). Additionally, between 1985 and 1993,
African American and Hispanic populations were observed as being overrepresented in gun violence (Cook and Ludwig, 2000). In an article by Pahn,
Knopov, and Siegel (2017) in The Conversation, the authors affirm Cook and
Ludwig's assertions, finding that African Americans, in particular, are eight times
more likely to be killed by a firearm-related incident than white Americans. Also,
in 1997, Messner and Rosenfeld concluded that as of 1991, homicide is the
leading cause of death among African American adults. Messner and Rosenfeld
(1997) compared the ratios of homicide among African Americans and whites in
the early 1990s and noted that the lifetime probability of a black male being a
victim of a homicide is 1 in 26, whereas for whites, it is 1 in 170. Therefore, there
is a significant discrepancy between the chances of a black male adult dying
compared to a white male adult.
Recent statistics from the Centers for Disease and Control and Prevention
(CDC) in 2015 show that homicide was the leading cause of death among black
males aged 15-34. For the same year, the CDC also found that white males aged
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15-19 and 20-24 are most likely to die from unintentional injuries, with homicide
being the third leading cause of death for white males aged 15-19 and 20-24.
Overall 38,658 individuals died due to a firearm-related injury in 2016. For that
year, the age-adjusted death rate for white males was 55.7% lower than for black
males, and the rate for white females was 20.8% lower than for black females
(Xu et al. 2017). Also, particular states are impacted more than others
concerning gun homicide rates. For instance, Texas and California exhibited
more firearms deaths per capita than any other state for the years 2014 through
2016 (Xu et al. 2017).
There is considerable speculation as to why young black males have been
disproportionately involved in homicides by firearm. Perhaps the most cogent
explanation is one grounded in routine activities theory, as put forth by Sampson
(1997). That is, the combination of time, space, suitable targets, and the lack of
guardians facilitates an environment where crime can flourish (Sampson, 1997).
Furthermore, African Americans are segregated into improvised communities
where crime is more rampant, resulting in more African American individuals
becoming involved in the crime by which they are surrounded.
A Brief History of Firearm-Related Homicide
Another relevant trend is that firearm-related homicides had been varying
considerably between the years 1950 and 1995, such that some years
demonstrated high rates of firearm-related homicides while other years
demonstrated relatively lower rates, with homicide peaking in 1980 (Cook and
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Ludwig, 2000). Since the 1980s after the peak years for violence associated with
crack turf wars, the country evolved technologically and culturally, yet despite
serious violent and property crime rates having declined between 50 and 69%
nationally between the years 1993 and 2017 (Gramlich, 2019), gun violence and
gun-control remain hot-button political issues with guns accounting for a
noteworthy portion of serious crime. For instance, in the year 2000, firearms had
some involvement in 66 percent of homicides, 26 percent of robberies, 6 percent
of aggravated assaults, and 8 percent of all violent part 1 index crimes in general
(Kovandzic & Marvell, 2003). Furthermore, criminological and public health
research has shed light on other gun-related trends. For example, between 1950
and 1990, suicide rates increased by 60 percent (Cook and Ludwig, 2000).
Data collected by the CDC for the years 1950 to 1993 also demonstrated that the
United States had the highest rates of childhood suicide and firearm-related
deaths than any other developed country, according to a cohesive report by the
Division of Violence Prevention, National Center for Injury Prevention and
Control, and the CDC. According to this same report, overall firearm-related
suicides from 1950-1993 was 77 percent higher than all other countries
combined (Singh, 1994).
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Gun Crime in the 2000s and the Emergence of Mass Shootings
A more recent phenomenon elevating the moral panic over gun violence is
the increase in mass shootings in the United States1. The moral panic seems
due to the public’s perception that their occurrence is making a significant
contribution to gun violence in the United States. It is also likely due to the harm
to society that comes from senseless and frightening deaths and the manner in
which these events are occurring. In a bit of a twist to the gun crime/gun control
debate, the United States has experienced a rise in mass shootings. According
to data compiled by Mother Jones magazine, since 1982, there have been 118
mass shooting incidents where four or more casualties occurred, not including
the perpetrator, with 19.49% of them occurring in 2018 and 2019 (Follman,
Aronsen, and Pan, 2019). As stated in an article by the online news site, VOX,
the Mayors Against Illegal Guns examined FBI crime data and found that fewer
than 1 percent of individuals killed by homicide in 2010, were associated with a
mass shooting incident where there were four or more victims (Matthews, 2018).
News media coverage on mass shootings, however, might be facilitating a false
impression that they are a bigger problem than they are. Though this might be
driven by a variety of factors, including that several of the more recent mass
shootings have been the deadliest in modern history, and because such
incidents are amplified by not only traditional media but by social media as well.

1

There is an ongoing disagreement over the definition of a mass shooting, differing between the FBI's
definition, which does not include the perpetrator in the minimum of four fatalities needed to be
considered mass murder, which other organizations include the perpetrator in the four deaths.
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This assertion is not to undermine the social harm mass shootings cause among
the general public. However, despite statistics showing that in addition to the
immense emotional distress, the US is experiencing 31 percent of all the world’s
mass shootings with only 5 percent of the world’s population (Christensen, 2017).
Mass shootings are relatively infrequent when compared to everyday gun
violence trends and comprise only a small percentage of overall deaths from
guns.
There is a growing body of peer-reviewed criminological studies on mass
shootings that have focused on several elements of the phenomenon, such as
gun availability, mental health, and race. For example, Fox and DeLateur (2014)
examined several misconceptions about mass shootings and how to prevent
them. A few of the main misconceptions they focused on were: 1) mass shooters
kill on a whim without much premeditation due to a mental illness, 2) more
stringent background checks will aid in limiting those who are mentally unstable
from acquiring a firearm, and 3) right to carry legislation will deter mass shooters
from acting. Their research found that the majority of mass shooters have a
calculated plan before going on their rampage, and that very few of these
individuals set out to kill random individuals. More often than not, mass shootings
are highly thought out and premeditated, and most commonly occur out of
revenge, power, loyalty, terror, or profit (Fox and DeLateur, 2014).
Stricter or more prevalent background checks are unlikely to significantly
prevent mass shootings, either due to the majority of mass shooters not having a
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criminal history or a history of mental health issues. Research on ninety-three
mass shootings by the Mayors Against Illegal Guns in 2013 concluded that none
of the perpetrators had ever been arrested or hospitalized for a mental health
disorder; only in 10 cases was the perpetrator in contact with a mental health
professional or authority figure (Fox and DeLateur, 2014).
Fox and DeLateur (2014) examined the argument that gun-free zones are
more vulnerable than areas of the country where right-to-carry legislation is in
effect. They presented a study by Duwe, Kovandzic, and Moody (2002), which
analyzed the efficacy of the right to carry legislation on mass murders between
the years 1977 and 1999. Their results, based on a negative binomial statistical
model, found that right-to-carry legislation has an insignificant impact on the rate
of mass shooting incidents. The take-home points from the research presented
above are that mass shootings are not as ubiquitous as many news outlets
purport and that there is not a simple solution via gun reform to aid in reducing
their occurrence significantly and reliably.
Also, although the characteristics and circumstances of a mass shooting
point to a phenomenon that is different in some critical ways from the more
typical gun violence and homicides associated with street crime, their rising
numbers and the shocking nature of several recent incidents in Las Vegas,
Nevada; Orlando, Florida and San Bernardino, California has arguably created a
moral panic that is ratcheting up urgency in the debate. Nevertheless, relative to
most other developed nations, the United States remains an outlier where mass
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shootings are concerned. An outlier where such status seems to speak to the
central issues in the gun crime/gun control debate, and of which, there are many
opinions on how to combat gun violence properly. They are exemplified by the
many legislative changes that have given rise to a plethora of interventions that
can and have been tested. In this study, I propose to test only one.
The Great American Crime Decline
The United States has demonstrated an unprecedented and unexplained
decline in crime rates since 1991 (Barker, 2010). Crime rates peaked nationally
during the early 1990s and have since been on a steady decline ever since with
the exception of 2004-2006, and 2016 when the U.S exhibited a slight increase in
violent crime (Gramlich, 2019). This observation is backed by research efforts set
forth by the FBI, such that the FBI assessed around 18,000 jurisdictions for
crimes reported to a plethora of police agencies, primarily crimes that are
categorized as severe offenses as per the FBI definition.
Furthermore, the Bureau of Justice Statistics has also played a significant
role in documenting crime rates by gathering annual National Crime Victimization
Surveys. Each year the BJS gathers self-report data on around 90,000
households in the United States, asking individuals directly if they have been a
victim of a crime for that year. Given these two reliable sources of data regarding
crime rates in the United States on a national level, reports have exhibited a
decline in crime rates since 1993 (Gramlich, 2019). Specifically, a 49% decrease
in violent crime from the years 1993 and 2017 according to the numbers
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calculated by the annual reports conducted by the FBI for that period. According
to the self-report measures taken by the Bureau of Justice Statistics, the crime
rate declined by 74% relative to the peak in 1993, for the same period of 19932017. The NCVS survey also supports this decline.
Despite the perception of the public not aligning with the data reported by
the FBI or BJS; such that the public perceives crime to be at about the same if
not a higher rate than the early 1990s, crime is objectively at a lower rate in 2017
than any year prior, dating back to 1993 (Gramlich, 2019). Many researchers
have attempted to explain this phenomenon, of them, the most notable names
are Alfred Blumstein, Joel Wallman, Arthur Goldberger, Richard Rosenfeld,
Jeremy Travis, and Frank Zimring. Each of these individuals has examined a
plethora of potential causal factors as to why crime went down so steadily
beginning in the early 1990s.
In his 2006 book The Great American Crime Decline, Zimring outlined
criminal justice efficacy, demographics, and economic factors as being the most
likely reasons as to explain the crime drop (Barker, 2010, p. 491). Criminal justice
efficacy refers to the implementation of various policing tactics and higher
incarceration rates. Demographics in this context is denoting the declining
prevalence of younger people in society, such that younger people more
frequently commit crimes. Finally, economic factors that Zimring identifies
predominantly as job availability, which was higher in the mid-1990s, might also
have played a role in the crime decline. Travis and Waul (2002) claim that
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advances in law enforcement tactics and crime data technology have contributed
to the crime decline since the mid-1990s. Blumstein and Rosenfeld (2008) author
a book on the subject and explain one of the potential causes of the crime
decline is the average age of U.S. citizens increasing, leading to less young
people who are the demographic which commits the most crime. Blumstein and
Wallman (2005) attribute the crime decline to the decrease of crack cocaine
usage relative to the 1980s.
One significant gap that Barker (2010) identifies in her review of studies
on the great American crime drop is that social dynamics and social changes are
rarely considered when analyzing this decline in overall crime (p. 492). Barker
notes that revisiting the conundrum that is the great American crime drop, might
best be done by urban sociological researchers, primarily, reverting to the roots
of criminal justice in order to gain an understanding of this phenomenon. The few
key factors that have been brought to light by urban sociology regarding the
crime drop are minority youth rejecting crack cocaine in the mid-1990s, rebuilding
urban structures, and the introduction of immigrants with collectivist cultures into
neighborhoods which were once individualistic (Barker, 2010).
Considering the many theories as to why crime has declined over the last
25 years is relevant to the gun crime debate as well as this study because it
highlights the difficulty of pinpointing specific reasons as to why crime rates
fluctuate. Therefore, making claims about gun legislation and how it impacts
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crime based on a single research question can be exceptionally challenging,
considering that crime and delinquency are complex issues.

Effects of Gun Control Policies
It has been nearly eleven years since the Heller decision; therefore, there
are ten years worth of crime data post-Heller that can be examined to determine
if there was any effect of the Supreme Court’s decision on gun-related crime in
D.C. and another commensurate city compared to gun-related and other violent
crime in the decade before. Analyzing monthly crime data should provide some
insight as to whether the FCRA might have been effective in reducing gun
violence by testing what happened after crucial provisions in the FCRA were
found to be unconstitutional. The two significant provisions contained by the act
are discussed below.
First, the FCRA barred D.C. residents from legally owning a handgun
unless they met the requirements to attain a one-year permit from the D.C.
Metropolitan Police Department (D.C. Metro) Chief of Police. Second, all other
legal firearms (separate from a permitted handgun) had strict control
requirements that had to be met for a resident to own a firearm other than a
handgun for personal use. For example, there were requirements for storage,
firearm operation, and restrictions on place of operation. By examining data from
the D.C. Metro Police to study the ban, as well as the gun control requirements of
the FCRA, two separate explanations from an effort to limit gun crime can be
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tested. One, because the handgun ban is a form of prohibition, an analysis of the
effectiveness of preventing people from easily obtaining handguns in a society
that has long had an influential culture of gun ownership is discernable. Two,
whether the ruling that made handguns constitutional and thus legal to own
nationwide had any subsequent effects on violent crime and gun crime in D.C.
and the select commensurate city.
According to Pahn et al. (2017), the United States is responsible for 82
percent of all firearm homicides in the world. Research by Grinshteyn and
Hemenway (2016) found similar results, determining that the US exhibits
homicide at a rate of 7 times that of comparable high-income countries. They
note that in the U.S., firearm-related homicide is particularly devastating for
individuals aged 15- 24 years, such that this population dies by firearm at a rate
of 49 times that of other comparable developed nations analyzed in their study.
The frequency of homicides in the United States is still exceptionally higher than
in other countries such as England, even without considering guns in the
comparison equation. That is, the United States has more non-gun related
homicides per capita than almost every other developed nation. This fact takes
away the focus on gun availability being the primary reason for the United States
experiencing more gun-related homicides than other countries by a rate of 25.2
times and shifts the attention to other variables that might be unique to the United
States when it comes to violent crime (Grinshteyn and Hemenway (2016).
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Therefore, though guns may be contributing to the relatively excessive
rates of violent crime in the US, if they were not anywhere in the picture, the
United States would still be the leader in violent crime among other developed
nations. Messner & Rosenfeld (1997) postulate that the availability of guns alone
might not be a sufficient reason for high gun violence rates in the United States.
They discuss institutional-anomie theory, which emphasizes the importance of
culture when it comes to a society’s level of criminal activity. Based on this
theory, they claim a society that emphasizes economic dominance, such as the
United States, will exhibit unusually high rates of serious crime (Messner and
Rosenfeld, 1997 p. 1410). They elaborate on this point by providing insight into
the role of culture in shaping crime. They discuss how social status plays a role
in how people are perceived and treated throughout different cultures prevalent
in other developed nations. The degree to which a culture emphasizes the
significance of perceived social status, such as age or profession, has an impact
on how the members of society conduct themselves considering the laws which
they are subjected to. Messner and Rosenfeld (1997) suggest that cultural
differences might be able to explain the difference in serious violent crime trends
between the United States and comparable developed countries with different
cultural norms.
Consideration of different crime control policies is critical when it comes to
assessing the impact the Heller decision had on crime rates in D.C. During the
1990s, policymakers were continuing their efforts to combat crime through
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legislative measures. There is a large body of research that has sought to
determine the effectiveness of various legislative efforts to control guns and
reduce gun-related violent crime. Such research is relevant to this study as it
aims to assess the impact or lack thereof; firearm legislation has on gun crime.
Past gun control policies such as that One Gun a Month sanction (Rosengart,
Cummings, Nathens, Heagerty, Maier, Rivara, 2005), Gun Buy-Backs (Sherman,
2001), and Operation Ceasefire (Rosenfeld, Fornango, and Baumer, 2005) has
concluded little to no effect on gun-related crime. Limiting firearm purchases to
once a month does not reduce gun violence significantly because traffickers who
sell firearms in bulk are exceptionally uncommon and do not significantly facilitate
the accessibility of guns to criminals (Kleck, 2011).
Research on Gun Buybacks determines this legislation not have a
deterrent effect on crime as there were several instances where most of the guns
being repurchased were unusable or destroyed (Mullin, 2000). Operation
Ceasefire focused on directing police officers to crack down on criminals
trafficking firearms to juveniles, and gang violence. Therefore, operation
Ceasefire was only significantly effective in reducing general crime, not
specifically gun crime, as it was initially intended. Moreover, law enforcement
tactics, such as random searches, primarily occurred in impoverished
communities, which led to friction between community members and the police
(Braga et al. 2001). The cause of friction was because the individuals who were
meant to be aided by this provision were also subject to random police stops and
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frisks, which led to disputes about civil rights (Barker, 2010). Therefore, even
though some factors might have reduced crime in the short term, such as higher
incarceration rates and confiscating firearms, in the long term, these provisions
generated breeding grounds for more crime.
A 2005 study by Rosenfeld, Fornango, and Baumer, assessed the
effectiveness of three major policing interventions which sought to reduce
firearms violence. Two of the interventions they studied were New York's
COMPSTAT and Richmond Virginia's Project Exile. Before discussing these
efforts to reduce crime individually, it is essential to note that it is arduous to
determine which of these attempts had the most significant impact on crime
reduction because they were mostly all tried in tandem. New York's COMPSTAT,
was a computer mapping system capable of identifying crime hotspots. It was
utilized by law enforcement to increased patrol in high crime areas. Rosenfeld et
al. (2005) found COMPSTAT to reduce general crime, not necessarily gun crime,
and also determined targeted police presence does not always reduce crime.
Eck and Maguire (2006) concluded that there is no significant evidence
available to claim targeted policing reduces crime. They studied cities where
there was no increase in police presence and found that these cities still
exhibited a reduction in crime rates, no different than those cities where police
presence was increased. One example of this had occurred in Seattle when the
city experienced an 18% reduction in crime when police presence was also
reduced by 6% (Eck and Maguire, 2006, 209). Taking a look at firearm specific
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legislation such as Project Exile further demonstrates the difficulty of isolating the
effects of firearm specific legislation. Project Exile was a federal program
executed in Richmond, Virginia, which mandated sentence enhancements for
specific crimes involving firearms., Rosenfeld et al. (2005) determined it did
reduce the homicide rate in the areas where it was implemented, however, this
reduction in homicide rates was small and not because of gun control, but
because of the penalties the program imposed for firearm misuse. This type of
policy implication demonstrates how sanctions for firearms misuse were enough
of a deterrent to reduce homicide, but it does not explain much about trends of
gun crime. Such that many other factors like police size and incarceration rates
could have effected gun crime rates (Rosenfeld et al., 2005).
Furthermore, research by Blumstein (1997) and his colleagues found that
higher incarceration rates lead to more ex-convicts who have a hard time
reintegrating into society and therefore resort to crime. Thus the reasoning
behind Project Exile, based on the idea that increasing the prison population will
negatively correlate with lower crime rates, is spurious. Higher incarceration rates
do not always correlate with lower crime rates.
Lambert and Silva (1997) came to a similar conclusion regarding
legislation that penalizes the misuse of firearms according to the laws in place.
They found that when governments set forth legislation that effectively
compromises the accessibility its citizens have to their firearms, the result is a
reduction in suicide (Lambert & Silva, 1997). When presenting their research,
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Lambert and Silva point out that despite the immediate inaccessibility to their
firearms, individuals did not seek out alternate methods of suicide, a claim many
opponents of gun control measures used in an effort to give weight to the
argument that firearms are not a contributing factor to high suicide rates (Lambert
and Silva, 1997). On a similar subject of the effects of penalizing legislation,
Makarios and Pratt (2008) conducted a study of the effectiveness of policies and
programs that attempt to reduce firearm violence and found that enhanced prison
terms do not have a strong deterrent effect on gun violence. According to their
study, policies that base their foundation with fear tactics are not scientifically
backed by research concerning their efficacy (Makarios & Pratt, 2008).
Prohibition
At the other end of the gun control debate are arguments for the
prohibition and stringent regulations of firearms, such as what the FCRA required
in Washington D.C. This idea can be useful in making sense of the effects of
firearms in society. That is, gun prohibition, when it is intended to reduce crime,
might not always do so and may facilitate the increase of that which officials are
trying to control, and it may have many unintended consequences where the
demand for that which is prohibited leads to increased value and effort on the
part of others to satisfy it.
Consider one of the most critical widespread stints of prohibition in the
United States, the prohibition of alcohol from 1920-1933. In a paper by Blocker in
2006, he found that the reason alcohol prohibition failed in the US was due to a
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disregard for the law and the continuation of widespread alcohol consumption by
the people. Subsequently, alcohol prohibition facilitated an underground market
run by emerging organized crime syndicates. Prohibition thus primarily generated
more crime than it ended (Blocker, 2006). So, given this demonstration of
counterintuitive effects, on the surface, it would seem that the removal of a
restrictive law might lower gun crime rates. Depending on what the data will yield,
new knowledge about the full effects of prohibition should be obtainable by
focusing on how D.C.'s violence rates might have been affected by the FCRA
after over four decades of the prohibition on handguns.
Bagley (1988) discussed the effects of drug prohibition and supply and
demand. He found that in order for the war on drugs to work effectively, the
economy of the drug market, such as the potential to earn a substantial profit,
must also be impinged for there to be a significant effect on the illegal drug trade.
For instance, if gun prohibition set forth by the government, makes it difficult for
citizens to obtain a firearm legally, individuals may resort to a black market for
their guns, thus creating a demand. Citizens resorting to the black market
compromises the effectiveness of the prohibition regarding reducing gun crime.
Therefore, analyzing instances where gun prohibition is the bureaucratic
approach to gun crime reduction, might provide valuable information when
investigating how the firearms control regulations act affected D.C.'s gun crime
rates. Studies on prohibition in general, not only on firearms, can be useful for
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determining how well society responds to the removal of a stimulus from a
psychological perspective.
In focusing on prohibition at the international level, Kates and Mauser, for
example, examined the effects of outright firearms prohibition on murder and
suicide rates (Kates & Mauser, 2006). They found other variables to be more
significant in regards to influencing murder and suicide rates than firearm bans.
Necessarily, the researchers conclude that social, economic, and cultural
variables are more valid predictors of murder and suicide rates when compared
to the actual apparatus; in this case, a firearm.
Similar to Kates and Mauser, such that the instrument is not the critical
issue regarding violent crime, Stolzenberg and D’Alessio’s (2000) research on
gun availability and violent crime also shows that firearm availability as a
standalone variable is not enough to predict gun crime. They found that the
distribution of firearms in society is a more accurate predictor of gun violence
than is availability). Stolzenberg and D'Alesslo (2000) further concluded that the
concentration of firearms in high-risk areas at high-risk times by individuals who
have illegally obtained their firearms is a more significant predictor of violent
crime than only the gun prevalence in society. Mainly, they found that it is the
individual operating the firearm that is more significant than the availability of
guns. Moreover, they found that firearms that are legally owned do not affect gun
crime in any direction. That is, citizens who own firearms in accordance with the
law are not significantly contributing to a gun crime problem in the United States

30

(Stolzenberg & D'Alessio, 2000). Although they did not find significant support
for gun prevalence, increasing violent crime rates in the area where legal guns
are ubiquitous, they did, however, find support for the prevalence of illegal
firearms as a significant predictor of violent crime. The researchers also found
that stolen guns facilitate crime committed by juveniles.
In a similar vein, Kwon et al. (1997) had, prior to both Kates and Mauser
and D’Alessio & Stoltzenberg, assessed the effectiveness of gun control laws.
They concluded that variables such as socioeconomic factors, alcohol
consumption, and a society's racial mix, all have more influence on gun-related
deaths than gun control laws. Their conclusion suggests that if the United States
focused more on improving the poor socioeconomic statuses of its citizens and
less on implementing more gun control legislation, then there is a more
significant potential for gun violence and gun-related deaths to decline.
Effects of Liberalized Gun Laws
It is also necessary to consider the instances where governments have
demonstrated more lenient attitudes toward firearms by deregulating their
control. For example, as of 2017, there are ten states which have moved toward
exceptionally lenient gun legislation (Brown, 2019). However, the data on the gun
death rates for these states are mixed, such that among these states: Vermont,
Kentucky, Louisiana, Alaska, Wyoming, Idaho, Arizona, Missouri, Kansas, and
Mississippi, some on the list have a considerably low gun death rate. For
example, Vermont has the 36th lowest gun death rate in the US at 11 deaths per
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100,000, and Kansas has the 23rd highest gun death rate in the country at 13.3
deaths per 100,000. By analyzing areas of the country with relaxed gun
legislation, the crime rates in these areas provide a point of view, which contrasts
with the desired outcome of the FCRA. Therefore, studying an alternate method
to firearms harm reduction such as liberal gun legislation has the potential to
unveil limitations with the approach of strict gun control or prohibition, especially
if the studies on areas with lax gun laws demonstrate crime rates to be just as
low or lower than areas with strict gun laws.
A prime example of permissive gun legislation is when a state or country
allows its residents to carry a concealed weapon. Kovandzic and Marvell
conducted a study in 2001 which analyzed Florida's 1987 right to carry a
concealed handgun law. Essentially, the law allowed for Florida residents to
apply for a permit, which, if granted, would permit them to carry a concealed
firearm. Utilizing homicide victimization data from the CDC, they concluded that
Florida's right to carry laws do not reduce homicide rates. They found evidence
which demonstrates Florida's right to carry law increases robbery rates as well as
auto theft. Kovandzic and Marvell (2001) also provide several reasons for
Florida's right to carry laws being ineffective, offering that many residents already
carried firearms illegally before the law even went into effect. Therefore, when
the right to carry laws went into effect, instead of attracting new residents to
obtain a concealed carry permit, the law merely legitimized those who were
already carrying illegally and rendered no real effect on the rate of crime because
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most of these people did not commit a violent crime in the first place.
Furthermore, when criminals obtain a legal permit, the effects on overall violent
crime rates are insignificant (Kovandzic & Marvell, 2001). The second reason is
that the majority of Florida's residents demonstrated a lack of interest in the right
to carry in the first place.
The Legality of Guns in Relation to Crime Rates
The research on the legality of gun ownership relative to gun-related crime
is limited. There is a lack of information regarding the ratio of crime committed by
a law-abiding citizen with a legally registered firearm vs. an illegally obtained gun
by an individual who failed to abide by the sanctions in place in order to purchase
a firearm in their specific state.
For instance, individual states such as California require a universal
background check before one purchases a gun from an authorized dealer.
However, if an individual chooses to purchase a gun from the black market, they
are in possession of an illegal firearm and are breaking the law. One of the
questions researchers strive to answer is, which gun is more prevalent in violent
crime, the legally purchased gun, or the illegally purchased one? The reason
data on whether legally or illegally purchased guns are involved in more gun
crime is limited in the United States is due to a provision known as the Dickey
Amendment. This amendment is outlined in 1996 by the United States Congress
to prohibit federal taxpayer money from facilitating research on gun crime in the
U.S. (Clark, 2018).
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However, researchers at Johns Hopkins University gathered through
surveying individuals incarcerated in federal and state-level penitentiaries in
2004. Included in the survey were questions pertaining to the legality and origin
of the firearm the inmate utilized to commit their crime. According to an article
drafted by Dan Clark for the media news outlet PolitiFact, this was the last time
the United States government expended the effort on researching gun use by
inmates (Clark, 2018). The Johns Hopkins team effort led to a few conclusions.
First, about 40% of the inmates from the states with the least restrictive gun laws,
defined as states with laws no more stringent than what is imposed federally in
regard to firearm regulations, purchased an illegal firearm which they utilized in
their crime (Vittes et al., 2012).
Furthermore, Vittes et al. (2012) noted only about 13% of the inmates
surveyed utilized a legally obtained firearm for their crime (p. 29). In states where
gun laws are less stringent, about 37 states, Vittes and his team found that about
55.6% of the offenders they surveyed, illegally obtained a gun and used it for
their crime (Vittes et al., 2012). Therefore, according to the minimal research
available on the involvement of illegal vs. legal gun use in violent criminal activity,
it appears illegal guns obtained by delinquent individuals contribute to the
majority of gun-related violent crime.
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Guns as Crime Deterrents
Wright and Rossi (1994) surveyed nearly 2,000 incarcerated felons and
concluded that criminals are more worried about running into armed victims than
law enforcement. According to the Wright-Rossi survey, 34% of the felons
responding from state prisons said that they had been “scared off, shot at,
wounded or captured” by a victim armed with a firearm (p.13). The same
percentage said they worried about being fired upon by armed victims, while 50%
said they were more concerned with encountering an armed victim than
encountering law enforcement officers (Wright and Rossi, 1994).
A study by Kleck, Kovandzic, and Gertz (1998) assessed whether
individuals who use firearms for self-defense hold the notion that criminals should
be punished harshly, more so than individuals who do not use firearms for selfdefense. Their findings are such that individuals who use firearms for selfdefense do hold slightly more punitive attitudes towards criminals, but that this
effect is not related to the use of guns for self-defense; it is related to gun
ownership in general. Therefore, merely using a firearm for self-defense is not a
valid explanation for believing that criminals should be punished more severely.
The evidence is such that, simply because one defends themselves with a
firearm does not mean that these individuals have a stronger than usual desire
for criminals to be prosecuted (Kleck et al.,1998).
According to Lott and Mustard's research in 1997, shall-issue laws
allowing for concealed handgun carrying are more effective with respect to
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reducing crime than increasing police presence, making more arrests, other
personal security apparatuses, and social intervention programs. Lott and
Mustard (1997) use cross-sectional county-level data on citizens allowed to carry
concealed firearms in counties which permitted individuals to concealed carry
between the years 1977 and 1992. Their goal was to determine if allowing
citizens to carry a concealed weapon deters violent crime. They utilized an
interrupted time series analysis model in order to study the effects of allowing
individuals to carry a concealed handgun. By using this model, they were able to
compare data on violent crime before and after the law went into effect. They
found that allowing law-abiding citizens without mental illness to carry a
concealed handgun worked to deter violent crime.
In 1998, Jens Ludwig was inspired to study shall-issue legislation because
of the study carried out by John Lott and David Mustard in 1997. Similar to
Kovandzic and Marvell (2001), Ludwig's findings revealed that shall-issue laws in
multiple states, including but not limited to, Florida, Oregon, Mississippi, and
Montana, do not reduce homicide rates. Ludwig (1998) incorporated controls for
age and state factors not considered in Lott and Mustard’s (1997) study. He
claimed that with the controls mentioned above accounted for, shall-issue laws,
increase adult homicide rates. Ludwig counters these findings by arguing that
Lott and Mustard neglected certain variables while executing their analysis, such
as failing to control for gang activity, average socioeconomic status of the areas
they reviewed, and drug prevalence (Ludwig, 1998).
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Public Perception of Gun Control and Crime
The US seems to have become quite polarized regarding the role of guns
in crime or about their benefits to individuals and society with respect to selfdefense, and over the meaning and expanse of the Second Amendment. While
perceptions of gun policy or gun-related crime are not the primary focus of this
proposed study, the findings from it can inform perceptions by shedding light on
the effects of hand-gun liberalization on crime rates. Toward this end, it is
valuable to explore the contours of the American public’s perceptions briefly.
PEW Research Center surveyed attitudes about guns and gun control.
According to the survey, Americans, regardless of whether or not they intend to,
are exposed to firearms and the culture that comes with them merely due to the
prevalence of firearms in the US (Parker, Horowitz, Igielnok, Oliphant, and
Brown, 2017). Nowadays, 3 out of 10 US citizens own a firearm. Forty-four
percent of American adults say that they know of someone involved in their life to
have been shot. Twenty-three percent of Americans have felt threatened by a
firearm at some point in their life. About 50 percent of the US population views
firearms to be a problem plaguing the country (Parker et al. 2017).
According to the survey mentioned above, more than half of the country is
in agreement about prohibiting those with mental illness from owning a firearm,
as well as those on federal watch lists. Out of the individuals that own a gun,
most feel that owning a firearm gives them a sense of personal freedom. The
demographics behind firearm ownership in the US is broken down as such: 48
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percent of white males claim to own a firearm, 24 percent of women and 24
percent of nonwhite men own a gun, 46 percent of gun owners live in rural areas,
and the primary reason reported for owning a firearm is personal protection
(Parker et al. 2017). When it comes to gun violence, and the perception of it, 59
percent of non-gun owners view gun violence to be a significant problem,
whereas only about 33 percent of individuals who own a gun view gun violence
as a severe problem. As far a political ideology, Democrats perceive gun
violence to be a bigger problem than Republicans. The country overwhelmingly
believes (86 percent) that individuals who carry illegal guns significantly
contribute to the gun violence problem. When it comes to combating gun
violence, non-gun owners are more in favor of tighter regulation on firearms sales
than gun owners, precisely 56 percent, as opposed to 29 percent. More than half
of gun owners (54 percent) feel that owning a gun deters crime. The results of
the PEW report provide a comprehensive breakdown of the country’s perception
regarding gun crime and how much owning a firearm contributes to gun crime.
In an effort to alleviate gun crime, federal, state, and local governments
have implemented what is now a substantial body of gun legislation since the
country's beginning. Unfortunately, politics can get in the way of unveiling the
truth about gun violence prevalence in society due to personal and special
interest agendas. There have been numerous scientific research efforts to
determine the best course of action concerning guns in America and toward
uncovering the causal effects, correlative factors, and harm from gun-related

38

crime and violence. However, sometimes, opinion and personal notions seem to
carry just as much weight as rigorous scientific studies. Additionally, personal
bias tends to find its way into certain publications, which can skew the accuracy
of the results.
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CHAPTER THREE
DATA AND METHODS

The purpose of this proposed study is to obtain scientifically valid insight
into the removal of a formerly restrictive gun control law as a result of the
Supreme Court ruling. Specifically, the goal is to assess the impact of the Heller
decision on gun crime in Washington D.C. and to use Detroit Michigan as a
comparison state, as well as to evaluate the effect of the handgun legislation
which the Heller decision eventually overturned. This section discusses the data
and statistical methods for the creation and analysis of the statistical models, but
first, these are the research questions driving this study:
1. Does an intervention marking the Heller Supreme Court reversal of
Washington D.C.’s handgun ban affect violent gun crime trends in the
city?
2. Using Detroit, Michigan as a comparison city, how does a change in
policy regarding a handgun ban affects a city with a commensurate
history of violent gun crime and population size, relative to the city in
which the legislation was nullified?

The above questions address one of the central issues regarding gun
control, whether looser control (otherwise referred to as gun “decontrol”) will have
an increasing effect on violent gun crimes. The converse, that control of guns can
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lead to a decrease in crime, has not been shown to occur in any profoundly
impactful way, yet this does not mean that loosening regulations will not have an
effect. I will address this is idea in more detail below in posing hypotheses.

Data
There are two separate data sets I propose using in this study. The first
was obtained directly from the Washington D.C. Metropolitan Police Department
and covered violent criminal incidents spanning 1998 to 2018. Included in the
data set is detailed information on homicide, robbery, and aggravated assault
incidences, time and date of the incident, type of weapon, and locational data.
These data were obtained for analyzing crime trends in monthly intervals for
homicide, gun-related homicide, and total violent gun-related crime prior to and
after the Heller decision. The isolation of these variables is necessary because
firearms are involved in many types of violent criminal offenses, and the focus of
this study is on the effects of a policy change on violent gun-related crime and
homicide.
The second set of data comes from the FBI’s Uniform Crime Report. The
UCR is an annual report collected and presented by the FBI, from law
enforcement agencies throughout the United States. The UCR is a reliable and
official source of crime statistics on a variety of crime types. The FBI neatly
breaks down crime into two categories: Part I and Part II offenses. Part I
offenses, otherwise known as “Index Crimes,” are the eight most serious violent
and property crimes and are often used as the primary indicators of national and
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subnational crime trends. Part II offenses are considered less serious, according
to the FBI, encompassing all other offenses for which the FBI collects data. The
UCR data containing monthly information on violent crimes for cities and other
jurisdictions were obtained from the National Archive of Criminal Justice Data
(NACJD) housed at the Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social
Research at the University of Michigan in Ann Arbor, Michigan. These data will
be used to analyze monthly violent crime trends with guns based on a composite
violent crime index of murder and non-negligent manslaughter, gun-related
robberies and gun-related aggravated assaults, and gun homicide. These
variables will be measured in Washington D.C. and Detroit, Michigan, from 1980
to 2015, encompassing the years before and after the Heller decision. The
purpose if Detroit, Michigan, is to compare D.C. to a city similar in population size
and gun legislation and determine if the differences are attributable to the
prohibition legislation specifically in D.C.
It should be mentioned that there are several limitations to the UCR data.
One is that the monthly data are available only through the end of 2015,
providing a shorter five-year time period post-Heller incorporation. Second, the
data do not have information on offenders or other characteristics of the offense
to perform more specific analysis that might provide insight on any effects.
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Measures
The primary dependent variables for this study will be gathered from the
above sources. For the Washington D.C. model, the Dependent Variables are as
follows:
1. Total Violent Crime with Guns: This dependent variable will be
comprised of Murder and Non-Negligent Manslaughter, Robbery,
Aggravated Assault, and Sexual Assault involving guns and will be
measured as an observed monthly rate per 1,000 people over nearly a
twenty-year period beginning with January 1998 and ending with
December 2015.
2. Gun-Related Homicides: This dependent variable will be comprised
of Murder and Non-Negligent Manslaughter involving guns. This
variable will be measured as an observed monthly rate per 1,000 over
nearly a twenty-year period people beginning with January 1998 and
ending with December 2015.
3. Total Homicides: This dependent variable will be comprised of
Murder and Non-Negligent Manslaughter. This variable will be
measured as an observed monthly rate per 1,000 over nearly a twentyyear period people beginning with January 1998 and ending with
December 2015.
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Specifically, I will attempt to uncover any possible changes to the violent
crime trends involving guns in Washington, D.C., that might be a result of the
Heller decision. In other words, the goal is to determine whether the Heller
decision, which abolished the FCRA, had a significant impact on violent gun
crime trends in Washington, D.C.
Detroit, Michigan, was chosen as a comparison city because It is
comparable in size to Washington D.C., and its crime trends are also comparable
to D.C. as denoted in the descriptive statistics portion of this paper.
The proposed Independent Variable for this study is derived from the
Heller decision. As explained a bit more below, in an Interrupted Time Series
quasi-experimental design, the Independent Variable testing a policy change is
an “intervention.” In this case, a fixed point in time. The intervention is as follows:
1. An intervention in the Washington, D.C. monthly gun crime rate trend.
In this case, the date, June 26, 2008, is the day Heller overturned
D.C.’s handgun ban. This will allow for making a statistical
determination about whether Heller had any significant effects on
violent crime rates involving handguns in Washington D.C.
The intervention date for Detroit, Michigan, is the same as it is for D.C., as
this was when the Heller Decision took effect. The same independent variables
are used for both D.C. and the comparison city.
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Methodological Design: Interrupted Time Series Analysis
Interrupted time series analysis (ITS), a quasi-experimental research
design, capable of analyzing the effect of an intervention utilizing longitudinal
data (Kontopantelis, Doran, Springate, Buchan, and Reeves, 2015). There are
many examples of ITS used in criminology and policy studies. For instance,
Loftin et al. (1991) used an ITS design for their study to measure the effects of
the D.C. handgun ban on homicides and suicides. Their goal was similar to the
current study; however, they sought to determine if restrictive licensing and
prohibition of handguns in D.C. had an effect on the rates of homicides and
suicides in the D.C. area. That is, before and after the FCRA, whereas my study
seeks to determine if the decontrol of handguns in D.C. had an effect on violent
gun crime trends. Loftin et al. (1991) assessed monthly data on homicides and
suicides in D.C. before and after the handgun ban went into effect, which is why
the interrupted time series design is adequate. Loftin et al. (1991) compared D.C.
to surrounding areas and controlled for a variety of causes of death in order to
ensure that the differences are attributable to the prohibition legislation,
specifically in D.C. They measured the years 1968 through 1987, concluding that
a significant reduction in suicides and homicides occurred for the D.C. area, and
observed no difference in the nearby control areas where there was no ban.
In order to analyze the data effectively, ITS is employed in a similar
fashion to the Loftin et al. (1991) investigation of Washington D.C.’s Firearms
Control Regulations Act of 1976 and Humphreys, Gasparini, and Wiebe’s (2016)
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study of Florida’s “Stand Your Ground” law. Both studies measure the effects of
policy intervention and utilized trend data from before and after an intervention to
gauge its impact. Moreover, an ITS design is suitable to answer this study’s
research question and has several appealing strengths, especially when
analyzing large populations confined to a specific jurisdiction. The attributes of
ITS which make it suitable for this study are listed below.
First, ITS is an accepted method in criminology and the social sciences
that provides a partial experimental design for assessing the effects of an
intervention on a trend. Second, ITS provides for longitudinal data analysis,
which is necessary for contextual purposes due to the possible effects of the
firearms ban and removal decision being long-lasting. Third, ITS requires no
monetary investment as there is no experiment to coordinate and conduct, and
the measured data is publicly available and ethically collected; it is a quasiexperiment using secondary data analysis. Fourth, ITS accounts for data trends
before and after an intervention, therefore, it is possible to detect a change in a
trend as a result of a policy change, which might not be intentional but occurs
nonetheless. Last, ITS is relatively quick to accomplish compared to a fullfledged experiment, such as a randomized control trial, because again, there is
no need to construct a controlled test in order to gain data (Penfold and Zhang,
2013).
Although a randomized control trial might be optimal for analyzing
observational data, it is not possible to randomly assign the incidence of
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homicide and general crime in order to study the impact of the handgun ban and
the Heller decision. Therefore, this method is ideal for this study.
As with all methodological designs, ITS is not without limitations. Kleck,
Britt, and Bordua (2000) co-authored a paper assessing the validity of a
univariate interrupted time series design (ITSD) analyzing crime data after the
1976 handgun ban in Washington, D.C. Their goal was to determine if the
identified flaws regarding ITSD are significant enough to cause problems when
analyzing the data pertaining to the legislation. The main flaw noted by Kleck and
colleagues (2000) was the inability of ITSD to identify the causality of a shift in
the target variable. Furthermore, another one of ITSD’s drawbacks occurs when
assessing an intervention, in this case, a policy implication. The authors contend
that the ITS model is not capable of explaining why an intervention either had an
effect or did not. However, given the context of the D.C. handgun ban and the
Heller decision that repealed it, the scope of this analysis is toward determining if
there was any significant effect based on the policy change, based on the
available UCR and D.C. Metro Police crime data.
In order to portray an accurate representation of the population being
assessed and to determine the effect of the policy, it is beneficial to include more
than eight measurements before and after the intervention. Given the amount of
data at our disposal, it is desirable to add as many measures as possible to have
a stronger assessment and representation of the jurisdiction. One limitation of
interrupted time series is the inability to explain why an intervention worked or did
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not work. Moreover, ITS cannot make inferences on the individual-level (Penfold
and Zhang, 2013).

Expected Findings
This study is not testing a scientific theory, but rather the effects of a
significant event that had a major impact on a criminal justice gun policy, first for
the District of Columbia, and then two years later, nationwide. This study is a
departure from the Loftin et al. (1991) study, which measured the impact of the
implementation of the FCRA on homicides and suicides in Washington, D.C.
Therefore, Loftin et al.’s research focused on the effects of gun control, whereas
my study focuses on gun decontrol. More specifically, this study focuses on the
effects of the removal of the FCRA rather than the implementation.
Given that Loftin et al. (1991) found the restrictive licensing requirements
imposed on firearms in D.C. to reduce homicide and suicide significantly, I expect
the removal of the FCRA to increase homicide, gun-related homicide, and total
violent gun-related crime in D.C. The Heller decision liberalized individual gun
ownership, and therefore, could lead to an increase in illegal gun usage as
people motivated to use guns perceive D.C.’s gun restrictions and punishments
as less threatening or less of a deterrent. As such, the primary hypothesis based
on this study, which applies to all ITS models for D.C. is this:
H1: There will be a statistically significant increase in the monthly violent
gun crime rate trend in Washington D.C. in the five years after the Heller
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Supreme Court decision compared to the monthly violent gun crime rate trend in
the ten years prior to Heller.
Considering this hypothesis, I should note that it is possible no effect will
be detected, not due to a Type I Error, in which the Null would be incorrectly
rejected, but because many gun policies have not been shown to have any
effects and this seems to be in large part because the people who legally own
guns generally abide by gun laws so as not to lose this right and those that own
illegal guns are not necessarily deterred or moved in any significant way by
restricting or loosening of gun laws. Nevertheless, if there is an effect, then the
findings from this study will provide valid evidence and knowledge relevant to the
public and policy debate over guns.
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CHAPTER FOUR
ANALYSIS

Descriptive Statistics
The UCR data obtained from the National Archive of Criminal Justice Data
(NACJD) housed at the Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social
Research at the University of Michigan in Ann Arbor, Michigan, initially presented
several issues. The most significant hurdle with the NACJD data sets is that
between 1980 and 2015, the variables were categorized differently for specific
years. Therefore, there are a few preliminary steps necessary to get the data
ready for modeling. The most significant task was isolating and organizing the
particular data I needed from the entire data set to prepare it for ITS modeling
using SPSS statistical software.
The second significant alteration was mean imputation. In six years
(1993, 1996, 1997, 1999, 2007, 2015), a small number of cell data were missing
for each variable in the original data set. To resolve this problem, I utilized the
mean imputation function to generate an average based on the monthly cell data
directly before and after the cells with the missing information. Although there
was the potential for mean imputation to bias the standard error, this was not the
case for this data set since the missing data were random, comprising less than
one-half of one percent of all cells, and mean imputation did not have any
detectable effects on the ITS results.
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Lastly, I merged two crime variables, “Murder and non-negligent
manslaughter” and “Negligent manslaughter in both the Washington D.C> and
Detroit The reason for this was to ensure inclusion of all variables representing
intentional killing to be under the “homicide” variable. Moreover, there were less
than ten negligent homicides from 1998 to 2015, so it made sense to add the two
together and rid the distinction between negligent manslaughter and murder,
being that there were so few negligent manslaughter data.
Although the UCR raw data came with a plethora of crime variables, only
a select few were necessary for the goals of this study. In the end, I isolated
three key variables to represent the relevant subcategories for this study. The
variables constructed and measured for each city in the analysis are “gun
homicide” coded as “dcmurg” and “detmurg,” “Total violent gun crimes” coded as
“dcgun” and “detgun,” and “Total homicides” coded as “dcmur” and “detmur.”
These are the variables that best represent different constructions of violent
crime, specifically gun-related crime. Given that this study analyzed the effects of
an alteration in handgun legislation that would possibly affect gun and other
violent crime rates, the measures above were appropriate for evaluating any
impact in this regard.
In this section, I present descriptive statistics utilizing data dating going
back to 1980 in order to provide a broad picture of gun crime trends in
Washington, D.C., and Detroit, Michigan. It is essential to note that for the
interrupted time series analysis, the assessment was limited to 1998-2015 due to
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better model fit. The reason for limiting the period of the evaluation is because
ITS modeling works better with fewer data. If I had incorporated data dating back
to 1980, it would not have strengthened the analysis any further.
First, taking a look at Washington D.C., the monthly average for total
violent gun crime is 294 violent gun crimes per month from the years 1980-2015.
This measure comprises monthly gun robbery, gun homicides, and gun assaults
in Washington, D.C., from 1980-2015. Therefore, relative to the total violent
crime rate in Washington D.C. from 1980 to 2015, which is 1,419 crimes a month
on average, 13% of all violent crimes in Washington D.C. between the years
1980-2015 are gun-related robberies, 1.06% are gun-related homicides, and 6%
of all violent crime in Washington D.C. between the years 1980-2015 are gunrelated assaults.
Figure 1 depicts a trend graph representing the monthly average of all
violent gun-related crimes in Washington, D.C., revealing two peaks for gunrelated crime between the years 1980-2015. Specifically, in 1981 and 1995,
Washington D.C. experienced sharp peaks in gun-related robberies and
assaults. Conversely, around the years 1986, 1998, and 2011, D.C. exhibited
relatively low rates of the same crimes likely due to the same cause for variation.
This is a notable trend in every measure in this analysis because it is consistent
for each variable measured. One potential reason for these peaks and valleys is
likely due to the introduction of crack cocaine in the United States beginning in
early 1980, which contributed to considerable variance in urban crime rates
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nationally throughout the 1980s and into the mid-1990s (Grogger and Willis,
2000).

Figure 1. Total Violent Gun-Related Crimes by Month from 1980-2015 in
Washington D.C.

In addition to analyzing the years 1980-2015 as a whole, breaking up the
statistics further aids analysis. Refer to Table 1 for a visual representation of the
before and after measures. A comparison of gun crime rates before and after the
Heller decision revealed that the average monthly gun-related robbery rate is 202
gun-related robberies per month during the pre-intervention period in
Washington, D.C. This period in time, reflects an era where the FCRA was in
effect.
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Moreover, isolating the years 2009-2015, a time period when the Firearms
Control Regulations Act was no longer in effect, yields an average monthly gunrelated robbery rate in Washington D.C. of 124 gun-related robberies per month.
Given the difference, one can observe there to be a 39% difference in gunrelated robberies in Washington, D.C., when comparing the means of two
periods. Comparing the pre and post-intervention periods for gun-related
assaults; the statistics are as follows: The average monthly rate for gun-related
assaults from 1980-2008 in Washington, D.C., is 99 gun-related assaults per
month and the average monthly rate for gun-related assaults from 2009-2015 in
Washington, D.C., is 60 gun-related assaults per month. Therefore, there is an
observable difference of 39% between the two timeframes. Gun-related homicide
will be discussed separately as it is isolated as a measure further down.
The comparison city in this analysis is Detroit, Michigan. Therefore, the
same crime variables employed for Washington, D.C., are also utilized for
Detroit. The average total monthly violent gun-related crime rate in Detroit from
1980 to 2015, which encompasses monthly gun robbery and gun assaults, was
786 violent gun-related crimes per month. Upon isolating gun-related robbery
and gun-related assault, the statistics are as follows: the average monthly gunrelated robbery rate in Detroit from 1980 to 2015 is 416 gun-related robberies per
month, the average monthly gun-related assault rate in Detroit from 1980 to 2015
is 340 gun-related assaults per month. Relative to all violent crime in Detroit from
1980-2015 (at an average of 2,616 incidents per month), gun-related robberies
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account for 16% of all the violent crimes committed during this time. Gun-related
assaults, when compared to all violent crime in Detroit from 1980-2015, account
for 13% of all violent crimes.
Figure 2 depicts the trend for the monthly average of all violent gunrelated crimes in Detroit, Michigan, from 1980-2015. Notably, Detroit experienced
a sharp spike in gun-related robberies and assaults in 1983. Conversely, around
the years 1981, 1989, 2001, and 2015, the city exhibited relatively low rates of
the same crimes. One similarity between the Washington, D.C., and Detroit,
Michigan data sets is that they both show a downward trend in the same gunrelated crimes upon the turn of the century. This observation is accurate except
for 2005 when Detroit, Michigan, exhibited a rapid increase in gun-related crimes
for that year, whereas Washington, D.C., remained relatively stable into the late
2000s. Furthermore, both cities demonstrate a significant jump in gun-related
crime rates in the mid-1990s, and both cities experience a drop in the same
violent crimes in the mid to late 1980s.
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Figure 2. Total Violent Gun-Related Crimes by Month from 1980-2015 in Detroit,
Michigan.

In addition to analyzing the 1980-2015 data as a whole, I analyzed crime
rates before and after the Heller decision. Refer to Table 1 for a visual
representation of the before and after measures. By isolating the years 19802008, during the pre-Heller period, the average rate was 902 gun-related
robberies per month before the Heller decision. This period in time reflects an era
when the FCRA was in effect. During the post-Heller period, an era of time when
the FCRA was no longer in effect, yields the average monthly gun-related
robbery rate in Detroit of 395 gun-related robberies per month, or a 35% decline
in average monthly gun-related robberies after Heller. This is a similar decrease
to Washington D.C. For gun-related assaults, the average rate pre-Heller was
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351 per month. After Heller, it dropped to 288 per month, a decline of 18%
between the two time frames.
The next dependent variable I analyzed for both cities is the monthly
average for homicide rate. First, taking a look at Washington D.C., the monthly
average homicide rate is 20 homicides per month from the years 1980-2015.
This measure comprises “murder” and “non-negligent manslaughter” in
Washington D.C from 1980-2015. Therefore, relative to the total violent crime
rate in Washington D.C. from 1980 to 2015, which is 1,419 crimes a month on
average, 1.41 % of all violent crimes in Washington D.C. between the years
1980-2015 are homicides.
Figure 3 depicts a trend graph representing the monthly average of all
homicides in Washington, D.C., revealing one dominant peak of crime between
the years 1980-2015. Specifically, around 1989, Washington D.C. experienced a
spike in homicide. Conversely, around the years 1985 and 2001, D.C. exhibited
relatively low rates of the same crimes likely due to the same cause for variation.
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Figure 3. Homicide by Month from 1980-2015 in Washington D.C.

In addition to analyzing the years 1980-2015 as a whole, I analyzed crime
rates before and after the Heller decision. Refer to Table 1 for a visual
representation of the before and after measures. By isolating the years 19802008, during the pre-Heller period, the average rate was 23 homicides per month
before the Heller decision. This period in time, reflects an era where the FCRA
was in effect. During the post-Heller period, an era of time when the FCRA was
no longer in effect, yields an average monthly homicide rate in Washington D.C.
of 10 homicides per month, or a 56% decline in average monthly homicides after
Heller.
The average monthly homicide rate in the comparison city, Detroit,
Michigan, from 1980 to 2015, is 39 homicides per month. Relative to the total
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violent crime rate in Detroit from 1980 to 2015 (at an average of 2,616 incidents
per month), homicides account for 1.49 % of all the violent crimes committed
during this time.
Figure 4 depicts the trend for the monthly average of all homicides in
Detroit, Michigan, from 1980-2015. Notably, Detroit experienced one major peak
of homicides in 1987. Since that year, Detroit’s homicide rate has been on a
steady decline overall.

Figure 4. Homicide by Month from 1980-2015 in Detroit, Michigan.

In addition to analyzing the 1980-2015 data as a whole, I analyzed crime
rates before and after the Heller decision. Refer to Table 1 for a visual
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representation of the before and after measures. By isolating the years 19802008, during the pre-Heller period, the average rate was 42 homicides per month
before the Heller decision. This period of time reflects an era of time when the
FCRA was in effect. During the post-Heller period, an era of time when the FCRA
is no longer in effect yields the average monthly homicide rate in Detroit of 27
homicides per month or a 36% decline in average monthly homicides after Heller.
The last variable measured for both cities is gun-related homicide. This
measure accounts for all murders in which a firearm was involved. From 1980 to
2015, the average monthly gun-related homicide rate in Washington D.C. was 15
gun-related homicides per month. Relative to the total violent crime rate in
Washington D.C. from 1980 to 2015, which is 1419 crimes a month on average,
1.06 % of all violent crimes in Washington D.C. between the years 1980-2015
are gun-related homicides.
Figure 5 depicts a trend graph representing the monthly average of all
gun-related homicides in Washington, D.C., revealing a significant peak of gunrelated homicides between the years 1980-2015. Specifically, around 1991,
Washington D.C. experienced a spike in gun-related homicide. However,
beginning in 1991, the average monthly rate for gun-related homicide began to
decline steadily through 2015.
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Figure 5. Gun-related Homicide by Month from 1980-2015 in Washington D.C.

In addition to analyzing the 1980-2015 data as a whole, I analyzed crime
rates before and after the Heller decision. Refer to Table 1 for a visual
representation of the before and after measures. By isolating the years 19802008, during the pre-Heller period, the average rate was 17 gun-related
homicides per month before the Heller decision. This period in time reflects an
era when the FCRA was in effect. During the post-Heller period, an era of time
when the FCRA was no longer in effect, yields the average monthly gun-related
homicide rate in Washington D.C. of 7 gun-related homicides per month, or a
59% decline in average gun-related homicides after Heller.
Finally, the last measure in the analysis is gun-related homicide for
Detroit, Michigan. The average monthly gun-related homicide rate in Detroit from
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1980 to 2015, was 28 gun-related homicides per month. Relative to all violent
crime in Detroit from 1980-2015 (at an average of 2,616 incidents per month),
gun-related homicide account for 1.07 % of all violent crimes committed during
this time
Figure 6 depicts a trend graph representing the monthly average of all
gun-related homicides in Detroit, Michigan, from 1980-2015. Although Detroit’s
gun-related homicide rate peaked in the late 1980s as most of the previous crime
measures have in this analysis so far, in Detroit, Michigan, the peak is not as
profound as it has been for the prior measures. Indicating that the average
monthly gun-related homicide rate in Detroit has been slightly less contrasting
than it was for D.C. However, similar to the many other crime measures in this
analysis, Detroit’s gun-related homicide has decreased considerably since the
high in 1987.
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Figure 6. Gun-related Homicide by Month from 1980-2015 in Detroit, Michigan.

In addition to analyzing the 1980-2015 data as a whole, I analyzed crime
rates before and after the Heller decision. Refer to Table 1 for a visual
representation of the before and after measures by isolating the years 19802008, during the pre-Heller period; the average was rate 30 gun-related
homicides per month before the Heller decision. This period in time, reflects an
era where the FCRA was in effect. During the post-Heller period, an era of time
when the Firearms Control Regulations Act was no longer in effect, yields the
average monthly gun-related homicide rate in Detroit of 19 gun-related homicides
per month, or a 37% decline in average gun-related homicides after Heller.
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Table 1. Monthly Crime Counts Pre and Post Supreme Court Heller Decision
1980-2015

City

Gun Assault

Gun Robbery

Gun Homicide

Total Homicide

Pre-Heller Washington D.C.

99

202

17

23

Post-Heller Washington D.C.

60

124

7

10

Pre-Heller Detroit

351

902

30

42

Post-Heller Detroit

288

395

19

27

*Monthly data for Table 1 were obtained from the FBI's Uniform Crime Reports 1980-2015

All tables and figures in this section have been fabricated by the author of this
paper, Naveen Raj Madahar.

Analysis
I evaluated the difference between post-intervention trends and the trends
exhibited prior to the intervention, where the intervention is the Heller decision on
June 26, 2008, repealing the handgun ban in the Firearms Control Regulations
Act of 1976. In order to analyze the two trend periods, one from 1998-2008 and
the other from 2008-2015, I use an interrupted time series analysis design similar
to that of Loftin et al. (1991). Loftin and his colleagues studied the impact of
restrictive licensing on handguns in Washington, D.C.
Based on the nature of the intervention, a court decision that changed the
law at one point in time, it is hypothesized that the impact striking down the
handgun ban in the FCRA would ensure a gradual negative change in the postintervention crime trends. The same test is also conducted for Detroit, Michigan,
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as a comparison city for the same years, which was unaffected by repeal of the
handgun ban—comparing any observed effects in Washington, D.C., with
Detroit, Michigan, because Detroit shares a similar population size as well as
elevated gun crime rates. The comparison of Detroit, Michigan, and Washington
D.C. was done to observe how crime in a similarly populated city evolved over
time, relative to a city where the gun policy was significantly altered.
During the pre-intervention period from 1998 to 2008 in Washington, D.C.,
the mean monthly homicide count was 18.31 per month or a rate of .35
homicides per 1,000 populations per month. The reason for measuring the rate
per 1,000 is because Washington, D.C.’s population averages about 585,124
from 1998-2008. During the pre-intervention period, the mean monthly gunrelated homicide count in D.C. was 13.6 per month or a rate of .26 gun-related
homicides per 1,000 populations per month. Therefore, 74.3% of all homicides
during the pre-intervention period involved a firearm in some way.
During the post-intervention period from 2008-2015, in Washington, D.C.,
the mean monthly homicide count was 9.89 per month or .17 homicides per
1,000 populations per month. The mean monthly gun-related homicide count in
D.C. was 7.28, or a rate of 0.13 gun-related homicides per 1,000 populations per
month. Therefore, 73.81% of all homicides during the post-intervention period
involved a firearm in some way. During the post-intervention period, Washington,
D.C., exhibited a monthly minimum of 3 homicides for one month and a monthly
maximum of 24 homicides for one month. Throughout the pre-intervention period,
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Washington, D.C., experienced a minimum count of 6 murders for over one
month and a maximum of 34 murders over one month. During the postintervention period, Washington, D.C., exhibited a monthly minimum of 2 gunrelated homicides for one month and a monthly maximum of 18 gun-related
homicides for one month. Throughout the pre-intervention period, Washington,
D.C., experienced a minimum count of 4 gun-related homicides for over one
month and a maximum of 25 gun-related homicides over one month.
During the pre-intervention period from 1998 and 2008 in Detroit,
Michigan, the mean monthly homicide count was 32.71 per month or a rate of .44
homicides per 1000 population. The reason for measuring the rate per 1,000 is to
stay consistent with how Washington, D.C., was measured. The mean monthly
gun-related homicide count in Detroit was 23.21 or a rate of .29 gun-related
homicides per 1000 population. Therefore, 70.8% of all homicides during the preintervention period involved a firearm in some way. During the post-intervention
period, in Detroit, the mean monthly homicide count was 27.57 per month or a
rate of .44 homicides per 1000 population, where the average population in
Detroit from 2008-2015 was 709,059. The mean monthly gun-related homicide
count in Detroit was 19.5, or a rate of .31 gun-related homicides per 1000
population. Therefore, 70.5% of all homicides during the pre-intervention period
involved a firearm in some way.
During the post-intervention period, Detroit exhibited a monthly minimum
of 13 homicides for one month and a monthly maximum of 45 homicides for one
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month. Throughout the pre-intervention period, Detroit experienced a minimum
count of 16 murders over one month and a maximum of 49 murders over one
month. During the post-intervention period, Detroit exhibited a monthly minimum
of 9 gun-related homicides for one month and a monthly maximum of 32 gunrelated homicides for one month. Throughout the pre-intervention period, Detroit
experienced a minimum count of 11 gun-related homicides over one month and a
maximum of 35 gun-related homicides over one month.
Interrupted Time Series Models
Within the three interrupted times series models, the independent variable
or interruption is the day the U.S. Supreme court ruling in Washington D.C. v.
Heller in 2008 struck down parts of the FCRA, including the restrictive licensing
requirements on owning a handgun. Each model tests a different dependent
variable. The dependent variables include the number of total homicides in
Washington, D.C. per month, the number of gun homicides in Washington, D.C.
per month, the monthly rate of total gun-related crime in Washington, D.C.
(excluding rape). These same crime variables were used in measuring Detroit
gun crimes for comparative purposes. Each ITS model produced an R-squared
statistic, which is the measure of how much variance in the dependent variable is
explained by the independent variable; in this case, how much of the change in
gun crime in Washington D.C. can be explained by the Heller decision.
The Ljung-Box test examines autocorrelation of the difference between
predicted and observed values, also known as the residuals. The purpose of this
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test is to determine if the residuals are different from zero. Effectively, this test
measures whether the correlations of signals within themselves
(autocorrelations) for the residuals are non-zero. Based on the p-value of the
Ljung-Box, which determines whether or not autocorrelation is too high in the
model, one can determine how well the time series model fits the data. If the pvalue is above .05, then the null hypothesis cannot be rejected, and one would
have to say there was too much residual autocorrelation. If the p-value is less
than .05, one can say the model fit is good and can reject the null.
This test was applied to the residuals of the interrupted time series
analysis, subsequent to fitting an autoregressive integrated moving average
(ARIMA) statistic to the data. ARIMA is a method by which time-series data can
be modeled for predicting future data characteristics such as growth and decline
patterns, the rate of the growth and decline, and the statistical noise or how much
the data points are fluctuating. Essentially, the ARIMA statistic tracks moving
averages as they change and determines if the interruption is significant or not.
One key note about the ARIMA statistic is that it does not predict future trends;
instead, it is useful for assessing past trends.
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Results
Gun Homicide Model
For the ITS model measuring gun homicides in Washington D.C., the Rsquared for D.C. was .47, meaning that the independent variable explains 47 %
of the variance in the dependent variable. The ARIMA statistic, which represents
the calculation of moving averages and determines if the interruption has an
effect, for the D.C. gun homicide model is .003. However, in the D.C. gun
homicide model, the interruption does not significantly explain the trend for the
dependent variables in the test. The reason for the lack of statistical significance
is because the Box-Ljung test's p-value for the D.C. gun homicide model is .051.
Consequently, the D.C. gun homicide model was not a good fit for the data, and
as a result, the interruption did not significantly affect gun homicides in
Washington, D.C.
The ARIMA statistic for the Detroit gun homicide model is .000. For
Detroit, it was.159, meaning that the independent variable explains 15.9 % of the
variance in the dependent variable. Though the Detroit model was significant at
000., I could not be confident in rejecting the null hypothesis given that the
interruption took place in D.C., and Detroit was only a comparison City.
Furthermore, there were no controls in this analysis; therefore, I could not rule
out that unobserved changes in Detroit might be responsible for the changes to
gun homicide trends in the city. One noteworthy fact about the D.C. analysis is
that the Ljung-Box statistic was only slightly above .05, which is extremely close
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to being statistically significant. However, concerning the gun homicide model, the
interruption did not have a statistically significant impact on the crime trends in
either city. Therefore, the results of the gun homicide model do not support either
of my hypotheses.

Figure 7. Number of Homicides by Firearms per Month in Washington, D.C.

Figure 8. Number of Homicides by Firearms per Month in Detroit, Michigan.
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Total Gun-Related Crime Model
For the ITS model measuring gun homicides, the R-squared for D.C was
.493, meaning that the independent variable explains 49.3 % of the variance in
the dependent variable. For Detroit, it was .706, meaning that 70.6% of the
variance in the dependent variable is explained by the independent variable. The
ARIMA statistic, which represents the calculation of moving averages and
determines if the interruption has an effect, for the D.C. gun homicide model is
.000. The ARIMA statistic for the Detroit gun homicide model is .000. However,
in the D.C. total gun-related crime model, the interruption does not significantly
explain the trend for the dependent variables in the test. The reason for the lack
of statistical significance is because the Box-Ljung test's p-value for the D.C. total
gun-related homicide model is .341.
Consequently, the D.C. total gun-related crime model was not a good fit
for the data, and as a result, the interruption did not significantly affect the total
gun-related crime trends in Washington, D.C. Though the Detroit model was
significant at .002., I could not be confident in rejecting the null hypothesis given
that the interruption took place in D.C., and Detroit was only a comparison City.
Furthermore, there were no controls in this analysis, and therefore, I could not
rule out that unobserved changes in either city might be responsible for the
changes to total gun-related crime trends. Therefore, concerning the total gunrelated crime model, the interruption did not have a statistically significant impact
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on the crime trends in either city. In turn, the results of the total gun-related crime
model do not support either of my hypotheses.

Figure 9. Total Gun-Related Crime per Month in Washington, D.C.

Figure 10. Total Gun-Related Crime per Month in Detroit, Michigan.
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Homicide Model
For the ITS model measuring gun homicides, the R-squared for D.C.
was.464, meaning that the independent variable explains 46.4 % of the variance
in the dependent variable. For Detroit, it was .157, meaning that 15.7% of the
variance in the dependent variable is explained by the independent variable. The
ARIMA statistic, which represents the calculation of moving averages and
determines if the interruption has an effect, for the D.C. homicide model is .002.
The ARIMA statistic for the Detroit homicide model is .000. However, in the D.C.
homicide model, the interruption does not significantly explain the trend for the
dependent variables in the test. The reason for the lack of statistical significance
is because the Box-Ljung test's p-value for the D.C. homicide model is .051.
Consequently, the D.C. homicide model was not a good fit for the data,
and as a result, the interruption did not significantly affect gun homicides in
Washington, D.C. Though the Detroit model was significant at 000., I could not
be confident in rejecting the null hypothesis given that the interruption took place
in D.C., and Detroit was only a comparison city. Furthermore, there were no
controls in this analysis. Therefore I could not rule out that unobserved changes
in Detroit might be responsible for the changes to homicide trends in the city.
One noteworthy fact about the D.C. analysis is that the Ljung-Box statistic was
only slightly above .05, which is extremely close to being statistically significant.
However, concerning the homicide model, the interruption did not have a
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statistically significant impact on the crime trends in either city. Therefore, the
results of the gun homicide model do not support either of my hypotheses.

Figure 11. Number of Homicides per Month in Washington, D.C.

Figure 12. Number of Homicides per Month in Detroit, Michigan.
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Each statistic mentioned in this section is presented in table two. The
interruption is presented in figures 6-12. All tables and figures in this section have
been fabricated by the author of this paper, Naveen Madahar.

Table 2. Impact of Heller Decision on Homicides by Firearm, Total Gun-Related
Crime, and Total Homicides.

T
Mean
Difference

R-Squared

Model Fit
p-value

Trend

Interruption

6.66
0.32

0.46
0.15

0.051
0

7.59
0.51

0.46
0.15

0.051
0

2.08
0.39

0.49
0.7

0.34
0.002

Mean Monthly Rate
Mean Monthly Count
Variable

Pre Heller

Washington, DC
Detroit, Michigan

209.91
375.36

Washington, DC
Detroit, Michigan

155.73
265.82

Washington, DC
Detroit, Michigan

2497.09
8098.91

Post Heller

(per 1,000 opulation)

Pre Heller

Post Heller

Homicide
0.36
0.18
0.42
0.44
Gun Homicide
81.9
0.27
0.13
219
0.3
0.31
Total Gun-Related Crime
2185
4.27
3.46
6230
9.11
8.8
111
311
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CHAPTER FIVE
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION

Discussion
The purpose of this study is to analyze the impact of a change in gun
legislation on gun crime rates in Washington, D.C., and Detroit, Michigan. In
order to accurately assess gun crime trends, data from the National Archive of
Criminal Justice Data (NACJD) at the University of Michigan were used.
Additionally, data from the FBI’s Uniform Crime Report were also used in the
analysis. I narrowed down my research to two cities, Washington, D.C., and
Detroit, Michigan. Washington, D.C., was paramount for the analysis because
the change in legislation initiated in Washington, D.C., and primarily affected this
city. Detroit, Michigan, was solely implemented in the analysis as a comparison
city, leaving the focal point of this study on Washington, D.C. The legislative
change, in other words, the intervention, analyzed in this study was the Firearms
Control Regulations Act (FCRA). The FCRA was enacted in Washington D.C. in
1976 and nullified in 2008 by the Supreme Court ruling in Washington D.C. v.
Heller (2008). Detroit, Michigan, was used as a comparison city due to its
characteristic similarities to Washington, D.C., such as population size and
average crime rates. Both cities were analyzed using an interrupted time series
model, where variables such as firearm homicide, homicide, and total violent
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firearm crime were assessed for their rates before and after the Heller decision
(in other words, the interruption), which changed the fabric of the FCRA.
The interrupted time series analysis yielded insignificant results in each of
the three Washington D.C. models yet statistically significant results for the
Detroit, Michigan crime measures. However, I determined that the effects of
Heller were insignificant in explaining the change in gun crime trends based
across both cities, despite the Detroit models having produced significant results.
The Detroit models were deemed insignificant, primarily due to the lack of control
variables, which might have helped rule out other factors that could explain the
decline in crime trends observed in Detroit. If my analysis controlled for
influences outside of the Heller decision, the decline in gun-related crime trends
could have been narrowed down to the interruption.
Moreover, had Washington D.C. reached significance across all three
models, coupled with Detroit, this may have provided secure enough evidence to
reject the null hypothesis, despite a lack of controls. In short, the standard I set
for rejecting the null hypothesis and having high confidence in accepting my
stated (alternative) hypothesis was conditioned firstly on the evidence for
Washington D.C. to be compelling; by this, I mean, consistently significant across
all three models. Moreover, secondly, that Detroit would also look similarly since
despite not having the same FCRA statutes in the city, it is reasonable to
speculate that the Supreme Court declaring handgun bans in violation of the
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constitution would influence views about the rights of people to have handguns in
a way that removes some of the taboo against owning gun illegally.
Given that this study is primarily a departure from the Loftin et al. (1991)
study—in a sense it's diametric opposite--considering they measured the
implementation of the same policy for which I measured the nullification, some 32
years later, one might wonder why their results contrast to mine such that they
found the FCRA to reduce homicide and suicide rates subsequent to its
implementation significantly, and I find that its removal did not contribute to a
significant rise in gun-related crime in the same city. Notably, my analyses of
total homicide, as well as gun homicide in D.C., was only slightly above the
significance threshold at .051 and .051, respectively, while Washington D.C.
exhibited a 56% decline in average monthly homicide rates and a 59% decline in
average monthly gun-related homicides rates post-Heller (considering the full
1980-2015 trends). However, using a p-value threshold of p=.05 or lower, I could
not reject the null given that the models were insignificant and, furthermore,
because I did not include control variables. Given the lack of controls and the
overall national decline of crime in the United States, there is no way to
determine if the observed decrease in homicide and gun-related homicide in D.C.
is not attributable to unobserved macro-level forces.
In addition, the contrast in conclusions between my study and Loftin et
al.’s (1991), could also be because they accounted for alternate means of
execution aside from a firearm in their analysis regarding their measures. They
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also measured suicide, two factors that are significantly different between our
study designs.

Conclusion
This study sought to contribute to the literature on the effects of gun
legislation by employing a quasi-experimental ITS design to test the impact of
gun decontrol. Similar to many other studies, this study failed to uncover any
significant statistical effects of gun decontrol as a result of the Heller decision.
Gun crime in the United States is a complicated matter where policy measures
geared toward gun control and gun decontrol have across many studies
produced mixed results in the empirical literature, frequently leaving researchers
with inconsistent explanations. Gun culture plays a big part in effectively
addressing issues with gun laws. Given the political controversies and special
interest influences regarding gun rights and gun regulation policy in the U.S.,
researchers will need to seriously consider the association between gun policy
and gun crime to provide better empirical evidence that informs policy decisions.
The current study design is not without limitations. First, the timeframe of
data analyzed after the intervention was five years. The determination of an
effect due to the intervention is the most valid with ten years of data before or
after the interruption. Any more data points than that do not contribute to the
validity of an interrupted time series analysis. Second, neither of the data sets
include demographic information. The raw data sets acquired from the D.C.
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Metropolitan police department and the FBI’s Uniform Crime Report did not
include any measures on demographics. Third, the statistical analysis lacked
control variables such as seasonality and economy. Future research on the
impact of the Heller decision would benefit from incorporating controls because
any conclusions regarding the Supreme Court decision would be more valid.
Fourth, no determination of causality of a shift in the target variable is identifiable
because interrupted time series is only capable of explaining if an intervention
has either a positive or negative effect. Future researchers seeking to study this
topic might benefit from utilizing an analysis which determines causality to
strengthen their assertions with contextual reasoning. Considering these
limitations, based on the analysis, I find the intervention did not significantly
increase crime rates for any of the variables measured in Washington, D.C.
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